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In this study we examine the reasons for the differential adoption levels of a new technology, that of electronic switching, across firms in the US telecommunications industry. Using theoretical postulates from the market-structure inducements approach to firm behavior, and the behavioral theory of the firm, we propose that the incentives to adopt a new technology are positively related to the competitive pressures faced by a firm in its micro-market, negatively related to past levels of performance, and positively related to slack availability. Our sample consists of 40 of the largest firms in the industry. We use firm-level data collected for the years 1973, 1978, 1981, 1984, and 1987 , and the results indicate strong support for our proposition.
Our findings show that, in general, market effects via the mechanism of competitive pressures generated are strong in explaining inter-firm variations in levels of technology adoption in the period since moves to deregulate the industry began; however, the firm-level effects are equally strong, if not stronger, in explaining such variations both in the period leading up to the commencement of deregulatory moves and also immediately thereafter.
Introduction
It is by now well accepted, and also well articulated, interalia by Clark [lo], Penrose [48] and Solow [63] , that investing in relevant new technology is crucial to both a nation's and a firm's ability to remain competitive.
Yet, when firms in an industry have access to such new technologies, adoption levels across firms have been demonstrated to be not always uniform, for example by Davies [15] , Griliches [22], Lane [29] , Metcalf [40] and Rogers [56] . This issue of different adoption levels across similar firms within an industry raises two interesting and important questions. First, what are the factors that determine whether a firm will adopt a given new technology at any given point in time, and second, given that a new technology is available at some time, what is the process by which the new technology spreads, or diffuses, across the population in aggregate? In the US telecommunications industry wide variations in the adoption levels of new switching technology have been known to exist, and in this paper we investigate the question of what are some factors that account for these differences among firms.
Since 1960 when a new technology, that of electronic switching, was developed in the telecommunications industry, representing a significant improvement over the prevailing switching technology, firms in the US telecommunications industry have had a choice of replacing their electro-mechanical switching with the new elec-tronic technology. Electronic switching greatly enhances a firm's ability to provide a wide array of value-added services to the customer that they could not do so earlier. This technology increases the scope of teIecommunications firms by allowing them to offer tailored services, because electronic switching represents a convergence between the computer and communications industries, and it also reduces costs dramatically as Flamm 1191 demonstrates. ' Despite the well-known technological superiority of electronic switches, and the relatively low risks of conversion, the adoption level of the new technology across firms, and across time, has not been uniform. For example, our analysis of the adoption behavior of the top 40 telephone operating companies in the US shows that in 1978 their average proportion of electronic to total installed switches was only 18%. This proportion had increased to 55% by 1987, with the dramatic increase being explained as occurring due to the forces of entrepreneurship and competition unleashed by divestiture [ll] . Yet, during the same two time-periods the standard deviations of such adoption levels were 14% and 25%, in 1978 and 1987, respectively, thus revealing wide variations in adoption levels between firms. Our interest in this paper rests on the determinants of technology adoption in the US telecommunications industry, and in explaining this empirical phenomenon. While the second question we have articulated in the first paragraph, dealing with the process of diffusion of a given technology, is also interesting and moot, we do not deal with the shape of the diffusion curve, per se, for electronic switching in the US telecommunications industry. 2 Our study is anchored in the 10 year period 1978-1987, when significant technological and regulatory events took place in the US telecommunications industry. This time-window enables us to investigate a critica issue in a key industry during a period of major change, both cross-sectionally and on a comparative basis. The paper unfolds as follows. Because we have already highlighted that a distinction exists between adoption and diffusion, in the next section we undertake a brief literature survey on the ideas of both adoption and diffusion. Thereafter, we note the gaps in extant literature suggesting the need for alternative frameworks to explain firm-level variations in the adoption of new technology, and subsequently articulate the framework that we develop, which is principally based on behavioral theories of the firm. The third section contains details of our empirical research design. The fourth section presents the results and is followed by a discussion. The fifth section contains our conclusions.
Literature survey and framework development

Literature survey
A useful way to commence this survey is to examine the distinction between adoption and diffusion. Thirtle and Ruttan [67, p. 78-791 make a distinction between the two by stating that Adoption studies consider the reasons for adoption at one point in time, or the reasons for time of adoption of different users. In contrast, most diffusion models are dynamic and study the behavior of the diffusion process over time. Thus, relative to adoption, diffusion ' For instance, estimates within the Bell Telephone laboratories [62] and the GTE system [55] suggest that the transition from electro-mechanical to electronic switches reduces annual maintenance and operations costs by 6-7% of the purchase cost of a switch. Thereafter, a changeover from one generation of electronic switches to the next reduces such costs by a further 2% of the purchase cost. What distinguishes one from the other is the unit of analysis, the level of aggregation and the time frame over which each dimension is analyzed. However, we reiterate that our concern in the present paper is with the factors that determine the adoption level at any given point in time. [66] criticizes these models for their lack of economic content and lack of general relevance.
bath [49] , and Reinganum [50, 51] ; the second stream essentially includes empirical studies on the determinants of adoption as pioneered by Mansfield [41, 42] .
To answer the question as to what factors determine whether a firm will adopt a new technology at any point in time, game theorists advance the following proposition.
They suggest that the interaction of the profitability of the new technology for the user, combined with relentless pressures from rivals to reduce costs, will determine the exact timing of adoption and who will be leaders and followers. ' However, under a continuous-game scenario, the timing and extent of adoption is dependent on the expected payoffs for each firm from adopting a given level of technology at each point in time. To the extent that incentives are different among firms, there will be difference in the timing and levels of adoption because the perceptions of expected payoffs will be different. 7 ' Nevertheless, the preoccupation of game theorists has been on the timing of adoption of a new technology, that is should the firm adopt now or later. Their models concentrate on the profitability of the innovation to the user and have considered the exact timing of adoption under conditions of duopoly [50] or oligopoly [49, 51] . The main findings are that even when firms have identical and perfect information about a technology, strategic behavior can lead to a Nash equilibrium with different adoption dates, but as the number of firms increase adoption can be delayed.
Reinganum [50] shows that the first-mover or adopter reaps all the benefits of the new technology and hence there is a race to be a leader rather than follower. Her models do not, however, allow for the possibility of preemptive behavior on the part of rivals and instead assume that firms must pre-commit themselves to adoption dates. Assuming preemptive behavior, which may arise as a result of the incentives faced by firms, Fudenberg and Tirole [20] demonstrate that adoption timing will be different. 7 The studies cited above assume that the adoption decision is of a "once and for all" rather than a repeated game variety. [33] has remarked, competition exerts strong pressures on the managers of a firm to search for new alternatives to current production techniques and also to exert greater efforts. Competitors, through their superior efforts or choice of new technologies, may be able to offer lower prices, thus being able to increase their market share. This induces other firms also "to sell at equally lower prices or face the consequences of continually falling sales which in turn create pressures on firms to reduce costs and/or to seek means of doing so" [33, p. 2071 . So far this is a standard economic story. But from a behavioral point of view, as Leibenstein further articulates, the quest for lower costs transmits itself to individuals, at various levels within the firm, whose sense of success requires the firm to stay profitable or at least solvent, and of whom it is believed, or who themselves believe, that they can influence costs. These pressures translate themselves into attempts to seek high productivity points which were previously in the constrained choice set or were unknown 133, p. 2071. [35] in the optical scanner industry, and by Rosenbaum [57] in the cement industry; therefore, the micro-market structure literature suggests that there is a positive relationship between the specific competitive pressures faced by a firm in its micro-market, and the inducements for it to adopt a new technology.
The firm-inducement hypothesis
The competitive pressure arguments, nevertheless, assume that all firms are alike. Faced with identical competitive pressures, they predict that firms will behave identically, that is, ceteris paribus, adoption levels will be uniform. The empirical evidence on the positive relationship between profitability, liquidity and innovative effort or technology adoption is, at best, tenuous according to Kamien and Schwartz [28] . They also point out that the negative relationship between profitability and technologicat adoption has not received sufficient attention. In behavioral theory, slack, that is the existence of unexploited resources within the firm, is thought to accumulate over time with repeated success. Slack aids the organization in two distinct ways. First, it conserves the pool of unexploited resources to be used in times of unanticipated and uncontrollabie exogenous adversity. Second, it atlows what Levinthal and March [35, p. 3091 call "irresponsible" search. The presence of slack encourages managers to relax organizational controls thereby motivating search activities that cannot be justified in terms of their immediate expected returns for the organization. Rather, search for new and innovative technologies, even risky technologies, is initiated, "because of their attractiveness to some individuals and sub-units, and toierated because of the organization's current success in achieving targets" [36, p. 3091 . This sort of slack search enhances the probabili~ that new technologies wih be discovered, evaluated and adopted or exploited. The behavioral theory of the firm, then, presents a good case for a negative relationship between past ~rofitabili~ and current adoption rates.
The slack search hypothesis suggests that if the firm contains a pool of unexploited resources, in the form of excess liquidity or under-utilized assets, say in the form of a network which permits externalities to be exploited for the benefit of the firm and its managerial cadre, or unexploited refinements in technology, this excess slack may also encourage. However, in such a search process the cost-benefit calculus or expected returns for the firm may not be paramount motivators, as Levinthal and March [30] suggest. This sort of a slack search also enhances the probability that new technologies will be adopted or exploited.
In a similar vein Leibenstein [32, 34] also offers an intuitively appealing behavioral explanation for why slack induces search on the part of managers. By applying excess slack in the utilization of new technological opportunities that may be of value to the firm, managers can further their own careers. Also, as Davies [15, p. 611 puts it, "some managers might derive 'kudos' from informing their peers of their experiences with a new, technically advanced innovation." This provides a strong motivation to search for and adopt new technologies. In the content of new technology adoption, those technologies valued by the firm, because of learning spillovers and efficiency enhancements, are more likely to be adopted. Such learning spillovers and efficiency enhancements, in turn, are more likely to be engendered in a larger firm setting, where the potential for learning economies and technology conversion economies are higher. The existence of larger networks provides strong incentives for some managers to champion the adoption of these technologies, and thereby further their own careers.
Summary: The testable proposition
The above theoretical arguments may be summarized into a simple testable proposition. We posit that new technology adoption level is an increasing function of competitive pressures facing a firm in its micro-market, a decreasing function of performance, and an increasing function of slack.
However, we also posit that there is a tagged relationship; that is, adoption in the current period is a function of the above independent variables in some previous period. It is axiomatic that firms do not react instantaneously to both external and internal forces. Rather, there is a period of planning, analysis and evaluation of ahernatives before major strategic decisions are taken. Hence, the assumption of tagged relationship is grounded in the reality of how firms behave 1371.
Finally, the discussion so far has been of a static nature. As the technology under question may be adopted in a phased manner, over a long period of time, the assumptions of stable environment and stable relationship between adoption levels and inducements are unrealistic. Environments do change over time, and therefore the relative pressures exerted by each of the independent variables should wax and wane. Indeed, in the telecommunications industry the market has become more competitive over time because of deregulation. Therefore, we should see a steady increase in the power of competitive pressures to explain differences in adoption levels. Con- we should see a steady decrease over time in the power of firm-level differences to explain differences in adoption levels.
From a dynamic perspective, we therefore posit that there will be an increase over time, in the power of competitive pressures to explain differences in adoption levels. Conversely, there will be a steady decrease in the power of firm-level effects over time to explain differences in adoption levels. Figure 1 shows the inducements to technology adoption argued above.
Research design
Context, sample and data sources
The research is set in the context of the local operating companies in the US telecommunications industry.
There where i, j, M= 12 > >... N and where ylj is the dependent variable for the ith firm in the jth time period, Xjjk is the kth parameter estimate which is lagged, for the jth period for the ith firm, and e is the error term.
In the above formulation the dependent variable is logged but the independent variables are linear. i" The rationale for such a choice is as follows. We wish to estimate changes in the relative proportion of electronic switches to total lo The dependent variable is also currently bounded half-normally between 0 and 1 since the level of adoption of electronic switches as a proportion of the total switches owned by a firm can range between zero and one. The process of logistic transformation converts the half normal distribution of the adoption data into a log-normal distribution where log u is assumed to be normal with mean p and variance (T. switches adopted by the firms in our sample, and the relationship we seek to evaluate is the impact that the absolute levels of firm and market variables have on the relative proportion of electronic switches. In such situations Gujarati 1231 confirms the appropriateness of the above functional form.
We choose two data analysis strategies. A grouped-data strategy study will enable us to identify which variables significantly influence the dependent variable; however, in a study of a changing market environment like that of the US teIecommunications industry the overall results so generated may not be wholly insightful because of the structural shifts in the variables. Hence, a grouped-data study, where we identify the key determinants of adoption, needs to be coupled with a comparative analysis of individual cross-sections where we look at the unfolding changes in the technology adoption level associated with changes in both market and firm-level inducements; a dual approach such as this will then help in illuminating issues such as the theoretical significance of the variables in general, and those of causality over time. Such a comparative-statics strategy is particularly useful because while adoption levels are changing over time, the impacts of the different independent variables may also be changing.
We operationalize this strategy as follows. For each of four time-periods: 1978, 1981, 1984 , and 1987, we obtain cross-sectional data for the 40 telephone operating companies in the sample relating to their proportions of electronic switches on hand. Thereafter, to explain the variations in this dependent variable, independent variables for each of these firms for prior time-periods: 1973, 1978, 1981 , and 1984 are obtained and cross-sectionally matched. That is, data on the dependent variable for 1978 is matched with data on the independent variables for 1973, and so on. RecoIlect that we have assumed a lagged relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
This cross-sectional data is first grouped, and the grouped database of 160 observations, 40 firms for each of four time-periods, is used to estimate our first regression. In our second regression we introduce time-dummies, so as to control for specific time effects. The years used as a base for comparison, in this linear regression with dummy variables, is the period 1973-1978, since we estimate this regression with dummy variables with an intercept term.
The second set of regressions we estimate as follows. In our grouped-data regression we have controlled for time-effects by introducing dummy variables. Next, we estimate separate regressions for each time-period, where we treat each such time-period as a separate cross-section. Thereby, we augment our analysis by bringing out the changes in the different variables over time and undertake a panel-data study where we look at the same set of 40 firms over four time-periods. As we are taking a behavioral perspective, some of the impacts of the different variabtes may change as the deregulation proceeds, and our procedures, therefore, enable us to evaluate whether such changes are indeed occurring or not.
Next, in operationalizing our strategy for testing we face the decision of what time points to use for the purpose of analysis. One approach could be to use annual statistics for a given timeperiod of a certain number of years. This can be arbitrary since there are no underlying reasons why the independent variables should change annually or induce a change in the dependent variable in the immediately following year. Rather, based on detailed analysis of the US telecommunications industry context, we use the 5 distinct years, as earlier noted between 1973 and 1987, to be the years with which to carry out our analysis. These 5 years are chosen because they are the years when major milestone events occurred in the history of the industry, and will thus have been the most likely time-periods to impact on firms' strategies.
Review of i~dust~ euents and approp~ate~ess of time-periods selected
The years chosen for analysis are 1973, 1978, 1981, 1984, and 1987 Such factors tend to cause heteroscedasticity, which we try to control for, in the first instance, by expressing our dependent and independent variables as ratios, a procedure recommended both by Gujarati [231 a.nd Maddala [39] . However, prior studies [6, 71] This minimizes the effect of large residuals, or outlying observations and provides more efficient estimates of the parameters estimates, as suggested by Maddala [39] . 'I The estimation of the LAV model reduces to a weighted least squares problem, and also enables us to control for heteroscedasticity since most procedures for correction of heteroscedasticity also reduce to weighted least squares estimation problems.
Measures used in testing the model
The dependent variable LOGSWCH:
The adoption level of a firm is measured by the proportion of electronic switches to total switches of the firm at a point in time.
I1 Suggestions for the use of the LAV technique go back over two hundred years, and in modern-day economic thought development of ideas related to its use are associated with the name of Edgeworth.
However, computational difficulties prevented its use until Charnes et al. [9] showed it was computationally tractable, and the LAV estimator could be obtained as the solution to a linear programming problem.
The independent variables
Variables capturing competitive pressure. Competitive pressure is operationalized using two measures, as follows:
(1) the proportion of business access lines that a firm possesses relative to its total access lines (BUSLNPCT); (2) the relative urban density of the firm's market (PROPMETRO).
BUSLNPCT:
Bolter These highlight the importance of business customers, and suggest that if a telephone company has a high proportion of such customers it will also have a high degree of exposure to competitive actions. Within a market faced by local operating companies, business customers are most often the target of other competitors.
Therefore, if there is a loss of revenue due to bypass, it is from these business customers.
Bypass, as defined by Weisman 1691, is a direct connection between a customer's premises and another carrier (service bypass) or self-contained system that avoids services provided by any carrier (facility bypass). Bypass is the most direct threat to operating companies. Where the costs of bypass suppliers are lower than those of operating companies, then bypass is economically justifiable and operating companies will be forced to be more innovative and efficient to compete. Hence, companies with a higher proportion of business customers are more likely to adopt electronic technologies which minimize the risk of bypass by existing customers.
This measure is computed as a ratio of the business lines to total lines possessed by a firm.
PROPMETRO:
The second measure relates to the issue of the urban space economy facing each firm in its operating environment.
Berg (3) a measure of performance which is the ratio of cash flow to sales (CF/SALES); (4) a measure of slack which is the firms share of switches in its area (SWCHSHRE2).
CF/SALES:
Performance in any given year is measured by the ratio of cash flow to total sales revenue in that year. Cash flow is computed as the sum of net income available for distribution plus depreciation and amortization expenses. Cash flow to sales is a measure comparable among firms, and also a strong signal available to managers not only about their performance relative to their competitors, but also about the relative wealth generation capacity of the enterprise.
SWCHSHRE2:
We measure slack in terms of the proportion of a firm's installed base of switches in its operating area I2 relative to the total number of all switches in such an operating 12 We measure slack in terms of installed base of switches rather than in financial terms because these are resource rich firms. Therefore, financial slack is likely to be much less powerful than technological slack, which can lead to externalities, in explaining the variations in the technology adoption variable. Calculated as net income plus depreciation and amortization expenses, divided by the total sales revenue in that year fCF/SALES) 4. This is the square of the share of total switches in the operating territory a firm possesses relative to other firms (SWCHSHRE') area. As operating territories are well demarcated for telephone companies in the time-periods we study, the greater the relative installed base, the greater is the network density of a firm. This is because the number of interconnections available rises exponentially with small increases in the installed base, and provides a bigger arena for firms over which to attain the benefits of learning spillovers, as postulated by Sharkey [61] . Second, with a relatively larger network share there can also be economies of scale in implementation of technology through network conver- The measure we compute is, however, squared to account for non-linearities that may exist in the learning and conversion economies. The measure is computed, as earlier mentioned, as the proportionate share of total switches that a firm possesses, relative to other competitors in its operating area. Table 1 summarizes the preceding discussion. The descriptive statistics for the measures, based on the grouped-data, are given in Table 2 . Finally, the hypothesized relations between the dependent variable and the independent variables are displayed in Table 3 .
Results and discussion
The results of the various regression models run using least absolute value (LAW estimation procedure are given in Tables 4 and 5 . The results show that the overall grouped-data model, as given by regression (11, explains 21% of the variance (R2 = 0.21). The F-ratio (10.42) is significant (at P I 0.000 level) indicating there is r-statistics are in parentheses; * * * P < 0.005; * * P < 0.01; * P < 0.05. a good fit of the variables to the data. The results, however, show that of the four independent variables, CF/SALES and SWCHSHRE* are significant explanators of the dependent variable and are in the expected direction, but the effect of BUSLNPCT and PROPMETRO is not found to be significant, although the signs are in However, a more revealing set of analyses will be to look at the influence of the variables in the separate cross-sectional regressions, given in Table 5 .
Equations (3)- (6) network externalities, and the ability to lock-in existing customers to the installed base, are important in inducing firms to adopt new technology. However, the non-significance of the CF/SALES variable in these two equations has some very interesting implications. 1978 marked the beginning of serious moves to introduce competition into the US tele~mmunications industry. The possible import of this structural change does not seem to have been lost, even on those firms which are in a relatively more comfortable resource position compared to others; indeed, there seems to be a realization that existing cashflows can be quite easily attacked by others. If at the moment the better performing firms are not induced by their wealth-generating abihty to be aggressive in new technology adoption, they certainly are no longer behind either, as they seemed to be, according to the past negative signs on the CF/SALES variable.
The fact that competitive pressures matter very much in the latter time-periods of our study is brought home by eqn. (6). There we note that the firm-level variables are not significant in inducing new technology adoption. But what is significant, and of the right sign, is the BUSLNPCT variable. Business customers account for a significant chunk of these firms' income and profits; they are also the customers most subject to bypass. Therefore, those firms with the greater proportion of business customers would be hurt the most if these customers were to be lost. Hence, a way to avoid own customer predation through bypass activities by competitors, or by bypass activities of the customers themselves, is to have state of the art technology, and this seems to be the inducement for electronic switch adoption in the 1987/1984 period.
Conclusion
This study began with the observation that new technology adoption levels were not uniform across firms in the telecommunications industry. However, this phenomenon is not unique to this industry alone, and the findings may have broader implications for other industries too. Technical progress is critical for enhancing productivity and welfare. The benefits of such progress can only be felt if firms adopt new technology, and can utilize the benefits to offer new products and cut costs. Therefore, understanding firm-level factors as to what influences such adoption behavior is crucial for both business and public policy. Our study, which looked at the determinants of technology adoption in a major infrastructure industry while a unique natural experiment in industrial organization was taking place therein, thus sheds some light on what are the key factors that seem to influence firms as the industries that they are a part of evolve.
In our attempts to explain the non-uniformity in the levels of adoption of new technology in the telecommunications industry we have employed a distinctly behavioral perspective, rather than emphasizing the cost-benefit tradeoffs of a new technology under a purely rational-choice analysis. Firms are not necessarily rational in their behavior, but as a collection of human agents, react differently not only to the differential incentives and pressures provided by the market, but also those provided within the firm hierarchy. Thus, our findings in this study lend support to behavioral explanations for managerial actions of an exceedingly important nature. Our results also show that different forces are at work at different points during the evolution of technology and the regulatory environment within an industry.
The behavioral perspective sheds two crucial insights into the propensity for innovative behavior on the part of firms. First is the idea that the existence of competition is an important motive for engaging in innovative activity. But particularly important is the competition which manifests itself in the form of specific pressures in the micro-market of a firm. These micro-market pressures have significant behavioral consequences, leading to changes in overall firm behavior. When pressures are close to home, and actual rather than potentiaLor future cash flows are likely to disappear, incentives to be modern manifest themselves more significantly. Thus, we find that competitive pressure, as captured by more micro-measures is a better predictor of adoption decisions than the broad competitiveness of the environment, which is generally captured by macro-measures such as concentration or other market structure constructs.
The second powerful idea within the behavioral perspective is that past performance and slack availability are important motivators for en-gaging in innovative activity. These insights are of sufficient generality that they apply not only to new technology adoption, but could easily be extended to explain differences in the propensity of firms to engage in or invest in innovative or R&D activity.
Finally, this study may be extended along several dimensions.
First, it will be interesting to evaluate if some firms are habitually more innovative than others; that is, do some firms have a systematically greater propensity to adopt new innovations independent of performance or slack. Second, data can be obtained on an annual basis to understand the dynamic nature of the process of adoption, both at the industry level and at the individual firm level. 
